Read
the incident scenario, and write a response that is at least three pages in
length. Your response must include answers to the questions being asked. must
be referenced. Paraphrased and/or quoted materials must have accompanying
in-text and reference citations in APA format.
Scenario:
You
are the Refinery Emergency Response Coordinator for an incident at the SJV
Refinery which has been in operation since 1966. The refinery processes 120,000
bbls of crude oil per day, which has a sulfur content of 2.5 percent. The
refinery converts crude oil to naptha, light oil, and heavy oils using the
Atmospheric/Vacuum Distillation Unit with key equipment such as the following:
naptha, kerosene, gasoline, and diesel
hydrotreaters;·
isomerization unit;·
naptha reformer;·
fluid catalytic cracker·
coker;·;
hydrocracker;·
sulfur recovery Claus plant (catalytic
reactors); and·
polymerization unit (petrochemical section of the refinery polymerizing olefin
gases to produce polyethylene);·
distillate/gasoline blending tanks.·
The
refinery was initiating work on a major plant turnaround at the time of the
incident to complete required maintenance repairs, mechanical integrity
inspections, and modifications to existing equipment. Twenty contractor
companies (approximately 150 employees) have been contracted to perform this
work under the direction of refinery staff. All of the contractor workers
completed the refinery orientation training.
Work
for the contractor crews is assigned/scheduled each morning. On the day of the
incident, the day-shift (6 am to 6 pm) crew had been tasked with isolating the
acid gas feed stream for the Claus unit. Due to other work priorities, the crew
did not isolate the line as planned. A shift turnover for the night contractor
crew did not happen due to mandatory safety training that delayed their arrival
at the worksite. Upon their arrival at the work site, the night crew held a job
safety analysis (JSA) review of the scheduled task (line breaking of the acid
gas feed line to replace a segment) to be performed and the hazards present. No
pressure gauges or monitoring was present to indicate that the acid gas feed
line was operational. The crew initiated the line breaking activity (open the
line to the atmosphere) at approximately 7:45 pm under self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA), which almost immediately resulted in the uncontrolled release
of acid gas. A nearby ignition source from a welding operation ignited the
flammable gas. The following actions were initially taken:
The evacuation alarm was sounded and the
refinery emergency response team (ERT) was activated.·
The plant manager and the local fire
department were notified of the incident.·
The incident command was established at the
refinery office near the main refinery access gate to the south (this is the
furthest distance within the refinery boundary from the incident location).·
The refinery ERT incident commander
implemented actions required under the approved refinery emergency response
plan.·
The ERT was not able to immediately isolate
the acid gas feed pipeline.·
The fire department arrived on location and
assumed the incident command of the event.·
Additional
Relevant Information:
The refinery encompasses an area measuring
2000 feet by 1400 feet. The Claus unit is located in the most northern part of
the refinery, approximately 1350 feet from the main refinery access gate to the
south. The polymerization unit is operating directly adjacent to the Claus
unit.·
A plastic recycling plant is located along the
south fence boundary of the refinery.·
The nearest residential community is located approximately 1000 feet to the
northeast of the refinery.·
A major interstate highway runs directly
parallel to the plant, approximately 1/4 of a mile directly north of the
refinery.·
The ambient temperature on the day of the
incident was 85° F and the wind was blowing at 7 mph from the southwest to the
northeast.·
Work crews were scheduled to work 12-hour
shifts, 24-hours a day, to complete the refinery turnaround.·
Due to the age of the refinery, SJV has
implemented a robust mechanical integrity program.·
The refinery has a trained ERT that can
respond to incidents.·
Fixed water monitors are present throughout
the refinery to extinguish refinery equipment fires. The refinery ERT does not
fight fires past the incipient stage.·
The refinery has received notices of violation
(NOVs) from the local air district in the past several years due to gas and
liquid leaks from piping components, such as valves, compressor/pump seals, and
for excess sodium dioxide (SO2) emissions related with their sulfur plant.·
Due to historical discharges of organic
compounds, groundwater monitoring wells are present down gradient of the
facility. Groundwater underlying the plant has historically been encountered at
30 feet below ground surface.·
Hydrogen sulfide is present in the acid gas
feed to the Claus plant. The H2S concentration of the acid gas feed is
approximately 70 percent by volume. H2S and sulfur dioxide (SO2) have the
following physical properties:·
Physical
Property
H2S
SO2
Specific
Gravity at 68oF (20oC) 1.54
1.4
Vapor
Density (Air=1)
1.18
2.22
Flashpoint
-116oF
(-82.4oC)
Not Applicable
Autoignition
Point 500oF
(260oC) Not Applicable
Lower
Explosive Limit
4.3%
Not Applicable
Upper
Explosive Limit
46%
Not Applicable
IDLH
100 ppm 100
ppm
Questions:
1.
Discuss the hazards posed by the interaction of the hazardous materials present
at the refinery and adjacent facilities, including the resulting by-products of
the incident fire and acid gas release.
2.
As the lead refinery representative on the unified incident command (UIC), what
actions should be taken by the UIC to respond to this incident (please consider
all receptors).
3.
If the polymerization unit is engulfed in the fire, how will this affect your
response?
4.
All emergency responders participated in the post-incident critique. What
corrective actions should be implemented by the refinery to prevent the
reoccurrence of this incident?
